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We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level trust game 
representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market.  In a repeated game, an 
Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower.  A pre-experiment one-shot 
version of the game serves as a baseline and to type each subject.  We alter the transparency of 
exchanges between non-adjacent parties.  We find transparency of the exchanges between the 
investor and intermediary does not significantly affect welfare.  However, transparency 
regarding exchanges between the intermediary and borrower promotes trust on the part of the 
investor, increasing welfare. Further, this has asymmetric effects: borrowers and intermediaries 
achieve greater welfare benefits than investors.  We discuss implications for what specific 
aspects of financial market transparency may facilitate more efficiency. 
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Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare 
in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games 
 
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) investigate trust and reciprocity in a two-player 
investment trust game. Since then, the game has been studied extensively. Ostrom and Walker 
(2005), among others, review the literature and identify that social distance, communication and 
reputation all affect the degree of trust and reciprocity. The primary focus is on one-to-one trust 
and reciprocity behavior. 
In reality, many situations require multiple levels of trust. For example, when a person 
invests in a bond fund, he or she trusts the fund manager not to misrepresent the bonds in the 
fund. The fund manager, in turn, must trust the bond issuers. Alternatively, consider 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  In the home mortgage market, institutional arrangements 
emerged in which mortgages were originated by one firm (e.g., Country Wide), sold to an 
investment banker that assembled them into large packages, and issued Mortgage Backed 
Securities (a kind of CDO) that were in turn sold to investors. Investors trusted the originators to 
perform due diligence in evaluating the risk of borrowers, and security issuers to provide 
adequate data trails and loan servicing arrangements. This chain required multiple levels of trust 
to justify investment.  As the recent financial crisis shows, the breakdown of these serial trust 
relations can have drastic implications. 
Financial market crises frequently prompt calls for reform that include greater transparency. 
For example, in a letter to the G20 on June 16, 2010, President Obama states: “We should 
support efforts to enhance transparency and increase disclosure by our large financial  
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institutions.” He further asks for: “More transparency and disclosure to promote market integrity 
and reduce market manipulation.” (Obama, 2010). Transparency is often one of the goals of 
regulation ranging from current calls for reform to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities and 
Exchange Act. One of the stated goals of the Securities and Exchange Commission is: “a far 
more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so 
important to our nation's economy.”
1  However, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about the 
effects of transparency alone in naturally occurring environments.  Usually, regulation promoting 
transparency is tied to other reforms and occurs during a time of other changes to the economy 
(e.g., the Securities and Exchange Act).  Here, using a multi-level trust game, we study 
transparency in a controlled investment/trust environment to isolate its effects.   
The conventional two-player trust game is commonly interpreted as an investment game. An 
investor (the first player) invests money with a trustee (the second player) who employs it 
productively and chooses how much, if any, to return to the investor. Because each player is 
involved in each transaction and, hence, observes the play of all players, the game is completely 
transparent.  Our game extends this to include a financial intermediary, creating a three-player 
trust game by adding a third player (the intermediary). This allows us to control transparency by 
changing whether each player can observe the play of all others or only observe transactions 
involving the player directly.   
In our game, the three players move sequentially. The first player (the investor) initiates the 
process by sending money (any portion of his endowment) to the second player (the 
                                                      
1 http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#corpfin, accessed 10/27/2010.  
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intermediary) with the amount being tripled. One can interpret the tripled amount as the case 
where the intermediary creates value through the intermediation process (e.g., through pooling 
investments, diversification and increased liquidity). The intermediary then decides how much of 
the tripled amount to loan to the third player (the borrower), with the amount being tripled again. 
This can be interpreted as putting the money to productive resource use. The borrower chooses 
how much to return to the intermediary who, in turn, chooses how much to return to the investor. 
This effectively creates an intermediated market, generating gains from specialization and trade 
from two interactions based on trust and reciprocity. 
Our game is repeated, but we use an independent one-shot pre-experiment version to type the 
behavior of each subject in his or her role and for comparison with the repeated version.  In the 
one-shot setting, we find that transparency has little effect.  However, in the repeated setting, 
transparency of exchanges between the intermediary and borrower increase efficiency and 
payoffs to all parties. Transparency of exchanges between the investor and intermediary has no 
significant effect upon efficiency.  Only transparency in respect to the borrower and intermediary 
exchanges matters.  Transparency regarding the exchanges between the other parties does not.  
Further, we find that it is the transparency, and not the specific exchanges, that increases welfare.  
Last, we find that benefits are asymmetric.  The borrowers and intermediaries benefit more than 
the investors from the ability of investors to view the borrower/intermediary transactions.   
The elements of our three-player trust game can be found in the existing literature. First, our 
three-player trust game is related to the three-player centipede game with a binary choice space 
(Rapoport et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2004) and continuous choice space (Sheremeta and Zhang,  
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2010). Second, multi-level trust has been studied in evolutionary literature. For example, Greiner 
and Levati (2005) use a variant of a trust game in order to implement a cyclical network of 
indirect reciprocity where the first individual may help the second, the second help the third, and 
so on until the last, who in turn may help the first. As in a two-player trust game, the authors find 
that pure indirect reciprocity enables mutual trust in the multi-player environment.
2 Finally, the 
three-player trust game is related to a 3-person ultimatum game by Buchner et al. (2004).  While 
related, none of this research studies a direct, multi-level trust game that corresponds to pass 
through securities nor varies transparency in such games.   
   In the next section, we lay out our experiment.   Then, we discuss our results in Section II 
and follow with discussion in Section III.  
I  Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures 
A  Three-Player Trust Game 
We implement the three-player linear trust game shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, the 
investor sends some portion, s1, of his endowment of 10 experimental dollars to an intermediary. 
The amount sent triples on the way. Then, the intermediary sends some amount, s2, to a 
                                                      
2 There are several other studies in the literature that investigate direct and indirect trust and reciprocity in a two-
player trust game (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Seinen and 
Schram, 2006). By allowing receivers to reciprocate towards the other donors, Dufwenberg et al. (2001) find 
that indirect reciprocity induces insignificantly smaller donations than direct reciprocity and that receivers are 
more rewarding in the case of indirect reciprocity. Guth et al. (2001) find that indirect reward reduces 
significantly mutual cooperation compared to the direct reward. In the same line of research, Seinen and Schram 
(2006) and Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity in a “repeated 
helping game” developed by Nowak and Sigmund (1998). In this game, donors decide whether or not to 
provide costly help to the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipient’s behavior 
in encounters with third parties.  
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borrower.  The amount again triples.  The borrower sends back some amount, r3, to the 
intermediary.  Finally, the intermediary sends back an amount, r2, to the investor. 
B  Experimental Design and Procedures 
We design four treatments as given in Table I to study how the level of transparency affects 
trust and reciprocity. In each treatment, the investor is endowed with 10 experimental dollars and 
the game proceeds according to the rules described here. 
In the baseline treatment No-T (stands for “no transparency”), parties can only observe their 
bilateral interactions, i.e. the investor cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and 
the borrower, and the borrower cannot see the interactions between the intermediary and the 
investor. In the Borrower-T treatment, the interactions between the intermediary and the investor 
are transparent to the borrower. In the Investor-T treatment, the interactions between the 
borrower and intermediary are transparent to the investor. Finally, in the Full-T treatment there is 
“full” transparency, so all parties can see the interactions of all pairs. 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University at the Economic Science Institute. 
Subjects were recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate 
students. Subjects interacted with each other anonymously over a local computer network. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers 
were placed within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their own 
computer screen.   
6 
 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given the instructions for the one-shot three-
player trust game. An experimenter read the instructions aloud while each subject followed along 
with their own copy of the instructions.
3 All subjects were randomly assigned to a specific role, 
designated generically as player 1, player 2, or player 3 to avoid any value-laden terminology. 
Player 1 was endowed with 10 experimental dollars. In the first stage, player 1 made a decision 
on how much to send to player 2 (any integer between 0 and 10) and how much to keep. Each 
dollar sent by player 1 was tripled. In the second stage, player 2 made a decision on how much to 
send to player 3. The amount sent by player 2 was also tripled. In the third stage, player 3 made a 
decision on how much to return to player 2 and how much to keep. Finally, in the fourth stage, 
player 2 made a decision on how much to return to player 1 and how much to keep. All subjects 
were told that player 1, player 2, and player 3 can send some, all, or none of the amount available 
to them. 
After all subjects completed the one-shot experiment, an experimenter announced a second 
part of the experiment that lasted for 10 periods. No indication of this second part had been given 
before subjects participated in the first part of the experiment to avoid any potential super-game 
strategies.  The subjects also had not been told that the experiment would end after the first part. 
In the second part of the experiment, all subjects remained in the same role assignments (i.e., 
player 1, 2, or 3) as in the first part of the experiment. However, they were randomly re-grouped 
with other subjects who were in different roles to form a completely new three-player group. 
Subjects stayed in their newly formed groups for all 10 periods of the second part of the 
                                                      
3 The instructions, available in Appendix I, explain the structure of the game in detail.  
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experiment. It was commonly known that the new pairings would last for 10 periods and that the 
experiment would end at that time.  Each period corresponded to the three-player trust game and 
it proceeded in exactly the same way as the first part of the experiment. This procedure allowed 
subjects to participate in a single play of the game, without knowledge of a second 10-period 
repeat play version of the same stage game, as implemented by Burnham et al (2000) in their 
trust games. Hence, in one sitting, data are obtained from both single play and repeat play 
versions of the same game. We use the decisions in the single play version to type the playing 
characteristics of every subject for subsequent analysis.  
After completing both parts of the experiment, subjects were paid for the decisions they 
made in the one-shot three-player trust game in the first part of the experiment. Also, subjects 
were paid for one randomly selected play of the 10 decision periods in the second part of the 
experiment. The earnings were paid privately in cash (US dollars) and each experimental session 
lasted for about 50 minutes. Experimental dollars where converted to US dollars at a rate of 2 
experimental dollars to one US dollar.  The average experimental earnings, including a $7 
participation fee, were $23.15, ranging from a low of $8 to a high of $79.  No subject 
participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience with a similar experimental 
environment.   
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II  Results 
A  Efficiency and Payoffs in a One-Shot Trust Game 
Table II reports average amounts sent and/or returned by parties and the efficiency in each 
treatment. Efficiency is measured as the sum of all three payoffs in the group divided by the 
maximum possible payoff of 90 experimental dollars.   Reported Kruskal-Wallis test statistics 
measure whether there are significant differences across treatments.  Panel A in the top part of 
Table II indicates that treatments have little effect in the single-shot games.    
Table III reports regression results that examine the effect of transparency upon efficiency 
and payoffs.  Payoffs are the amounts earned by each person after all players have sent and/or 
returned.  In each column we report the coefficient estimates and robust errors for the investors’ 
choices (s1), the intermediaries’ (s2 and r2), and the borrowers’ (r3).  The independent variables 
are dummy-variables for Investor-T and Borrower-T treatments. Examining the data from the 
one-shot three-player trust game (first period), we find no difference in individual behavior and 
no differences in efficiency across treatments.
4  There is also no apparent difference in 
distribution of individual decisions across treatments.  This leads to our first result: 
 
Result 1:  Transparency does not change aggregate behavior nor efficiency significantly in a 
one-shot multi-level trust game. 
 
                                                      
4 In the one-shot game (first period), all individual observation are independent. So, we also performed a standard 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test and found no significant difference in decisions made by player 1, 2, or 3, and no 
difference in efficiency.  
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3.2. Efficiency and Payoffs in a Repeated Trust Game 
In contrast to the results in the one-shot game, there are significant differences in behavior 
across treatments in repeated games (Panel B and C of Table II). Treatments with investor and 
full transparency result in higher amounts sent, amounts returned and efficiencies.  Players of all 
types tended to have higher payoffs.  Table IV reports regression results that examine the effect 
of transparency upon efficiency and payoffs over time for the repeated game. In each column, we 
report the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for the player’s choices.
5  In addition 
to the aforementioned dummy-variables for Investor-T and Borrower-T treatments, we include 
an inverse period variable (1/Period) to control for learning (i.e, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, . . . , 1/11).   As 
shown in regression (1) of Table IV, transparency affects efficiency in the repeated game.  In 
particular, giving the investor full information about the transactions between the intermediary 
and borrower significantly increases efficiency. In contrast, giving the borrower full information 
about the investor and intermediary interactions, if anything, decreases efficiency.
6   
 
Result 2. Providing transparency to the investor (i.e., allowing the investor to see the exchange 
between the intermediary and the borrower) increases efficiency, while providing 
                                                      
5 The robust specification allows for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White standard errors. Clustering by group, or 
running panel models by group, replicate the treatment effects since each group of subjects only participates in 
one treatment.  That is, variance within and across matched groups of subjects can replicate exactly the within 
and across treatment variance. 
6 A median regression yields comparable results (coefficient values and statistical significance) albeit the Inverse of 
Period variable coefficient becomes marginally significant in addition to the Investor-T variable.  Results 
available upon request.  
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transparency to the borrower (i.e., allowing the borrower to see the exchange between the 
investor and intermediary) has no significant effect on average efficiency. 
 
Beyond the overall welfare measure, we examine profits of each player in regression (2).  
The treatment variable Investor-T is positive for all parties, albeit insignificant for the borrower.  
Shown in Table II, payoffs for the investor increase with full information (in respect to the 
investor), increasing 14 percent on average.  When the investor had transparency, in the Investor-
T and Full-T treatments, the average payoffs for the intermediary increased 21 percent and 
average payoffs increased 14 percent for the borrower. As a result, everyone benefits from 
investor having transparency.  In contrast to the investor, when the borrower had full 
information, denoted by the treatment variable Borrower-T, his payoff did not change 
significantly (if anything, it decreased).  Interestingly, the borrower fared worse in the Borrower-
T than in the No-T treatment, where the average payoffs dropped from 18.3 to 13.6. 
 
Result 3. Providing transparency to the investor increases payoffs to all players, while providing 
transparency to the borrower does not change payoffs significantly. 
 
Similar to estimation results for payoffs, regression (3) in Table IV reports multivariate 
regression results for the effect of transparency upon each agent’s proportion of payoffs 
(individual payoff as a fraction of the total payoff) over time for the repeated game.  The 
estimation results indicate that giving the investor information increases the intermediary’s and  
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borrower’s proportions of total payoff (see coefficient for Investor-T), and it decreases the 
investor’s proportion of payoff. Thus, while transparency for investor increases payoffs to all 
parties, the borrowers and intermediaries benefit by relatively more than the investors (who 
actually have the increased information sets).  As before, no significant effect comes for the 
treatment dummy-variable Borrower-T. 
 
Result 4. Providing transparency to the investor shifts the distribution of payoffs towards 
intermediaries and borrowers, while providing transparency to the borrower does not change 
the distribution of payoffs. 
 
Interestingly, the intermediary’s and borrower’s proportions increase over time, while investor’s 
proportion decreases, indicating significant learning. 
 
3.3. Determinants of Behavior in a Repeated Trust Game 
The gains from exchange, and hence payoffs and efficiency, are driven by the (multiplied) 
amounts sent, not the amounts returned. So in order to generate economic surplus, transparency 
has to affect the amounts sent by the investor and intermediary; while the amounts returned by 
the borrower and intermediary distribute the surplus and provide the reciprocity needed to 
encourage future efficiency through higher future amounts sent.  To measure these effects, we 
examine the individual behavior of the players and the determinants that influence such behavior.  
12 
 
Table V reports the regression results that examine behavior over time (periods 3-11) in the 
ten-period repeated game.  We use simultaneous equation estimation procedures to control for 
endogeneity.  In each column we report the coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for 
the players’ choices.  In addition to the aforementioned variables Investor-T, Borrower-T, and 
Inverse Period, we include the independent variable IType, which is the amount sent or returned 
in the pre-experiment one-shot game.  While the investor and borrower have a singular value for 
IType, the intermediary has one representing the amount sent to the borrower (used in regression 
(2)) and another representing the amount sent back to the investor (used in regression (4)). In this 
procedure, we are combining and extending techniques developed in two previous papers. 
Rigdon, et al, (2007) identified the IType of each subject in an extensive form trust game in the 
first period of a twenty period repeated game, and found this variable highly significant in 
explaining subsequent behavior in the different treatment conditions they studied. By following 
Burnham et al. (2000) in observing decisions in a pre-experiment single play version, followed 
by a repeat play version, we are able to measure IType before subjects know they are going to 
participate in a repeated version of the same game.
7 Thus, we test whether this independent 
IType measure persists as a predictive procedure for subject behavior in a repeated version of the 
same stage game.  
In addition, we include independent variables representing the observable choices in the 
current period: S1, S2, R3, and S1Vis which is S1 when visible to the borrower.  Also we include 
                                                      
7 Burnham et al. (2000) did not measure IType; their purpose was simply to compare single play with repeat play 
using data obtained from subjects in the same session. See Houser’s (2003) examination and discussion of types for 




variables representing the prior period’s observable choices: LagS1, LagS2, LagR3, LagR2, and 
LagS1Vis, LagS2Vis, LagR3Vis and LagR2Vis which are last period’s choices when observable 
to the appropriate player. 
As per the regressions (1) – (4) in Table V note the treatment variable Investor-T is only 
significant for the investor’s choice in regression (1), affecting the amount sent; the critical 
behavior needed to facilitate any efficiency at all.  On average investors send about 26 percent 
more when investor has full transparency, an average of 6.8 in the Full-T and Investor-T 
treatments versus 5.4 in the No-T and Borrower-T treatments.  Interestingly the amounts of the 
transparent choices, captured by LagS2Vis and LagR3Vis, are not significant in predicting how 
much of the endowment is put at risk, only the fact the choices were transparent matters.  Also 
the past amounts sent by the investor, LagS1, and returned directly to the investor, LagR3, are 
predictive.  
We observe that the IType coefficient is significant in all of these regressions, confirming the 
methedological value of our pre-experiment measurement of a person’s characteristic willingness 
to trust.  This is important in separating out a source of variation that enables better estimation of 
treatment and other effects.
8   
Examining the intermediary’s sending choice; the treatment effects are insignificant in 
regression (2).  The treatment effect is captured by the amount sent by the investor, S1.  Also 
notice that in all treatments all amounts sent and returned were visible to the intermediary.  In all 
treatments the intermediary sent on average 1.8 times the amount received by the investor except 
                                                      
8 Further, because IType is a constant across all observations from a single player in each regression, it also serves 
as an effective player fixed effect.  
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for in the No-T treatment where the average was 1.9.  The last period amounts directly received 
by the intermediary where germane.  The intermediary’s sending type determined in the one-shot 
game was predictive, but the amount send in the prior round was not. 
Symmetric to the investor, transparency differed for the borrower across treatments.  In 
regression (3) we see treatment effects are not significant.   The average amount returned was 1.5 
times the amount sent by the intermediary in all treatments, except for the No-T treatment, where 
the average was 1.3.  Again the amounts of the transparent choices, captured by LagS1Vis and 
LagR2Vis are not significant in predicting how much is returned, only the fact the choices were 
transparent mattered.  What was sent by the intermediary, S2, what was sent last period, LagS2, 
and what the borrower sent back last period, LagS3, were predictive in addition to the behavior 
of the borrower in the one-shot game. 
Finally we return to the intermediary in regression (4) to examine the amount returned to the 
investor.  The amount sent by the investor, S1, and the amount returned by the borrower, R3, 
increase the amount returned to the investor, whereas the amount sent to the borrower decreased 
it.  The amount sent by the investor last period, LagS1, and returned by the borrower, LagR3, 
also are predictive, as is the amount returned by the intermediary last period, LagR2. Again, the 
intermediary type behavior is marked significantly by her choice in the one-shot game.  As with 
the intermediary’s sending decision, the treatment dummies Investor-T and Borrower-T do not 
load, as we argue the treatment effects are captured by S1 and R3 where transparency differs 
over treatments.  The average amount returned to the investor was 0.55 times the amount 
returned by the borrower in the No-T and Investor-T treatments, increased to 0.57 in the Full-T  
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treatment, but decreased 0.48 in the Borrower-T treatment, where the borrower was not privy to 
the amount returned to the investor. 
  In summary, the multivariate results show that: 
(1) Players typed as trusting and/or reciprocating in the one-shot setting tend to continue that 
behavior in the repeated setting.  There is also significant persistence in investor and 
borrower behavior across rounds in the repeated setting.  
(2) Investor transparency increases the initial investments and overall efficiency as a result. 
(3) More investment creates more lending and more lending creates more return to the 
intermediary and investor. 
(4) History matters in a complex and interesting way.  Intermediaries seem to learn through 
time while all subjects appear affected by how other subjects treated them in the prior 
period.  Specifically, learning through time reduces the willingness of intermediaries to 
make loans, while good prior returns increases the amounts investors invest.   
The history effect creates an interesting, but complex, dynamic relationship.  In particular, 
the coefficients on LagR3 in regressions (2) and (4) suggest that, if borrowers do not pay back 
intermediaries, subsequent loans and returns to investors fall. Then, the coefficient on LagR2 in 
regression (1) suggests that investors will invest less in subsequent periods.  This dynamic would 
drive down efficiency and economic welfare.  On the other hand, higher loan repayment rates 




III  Discussion and Extensions 
We design an experiment to examine welfare and behavior in a multi-level investment trust 
game. In the scenario an Investor invests via an Intermediary who lends to a Borrower in a 
repeated game.  We alter the transparency of exchanges between non-adjacent parties.  We find 
that transparency does not change aggregate behavior nor efficiency in a one-shot multi-level 
trust game.  However, in repeated multi-level trust games, transparency matters. Providing 
transparency to the investor (i.e., allowing the investor to see the exchange between the 
intermediary and the borrower) increases efficiency and payoffs to all players, while providing 
transparency to the borrower (i.e., allowing the borrower to see the exchange between the 
investor and intermediary) does not change efficiency and payoffs. Providing transparency to the 
investor also shifts the distribution of payoffs towards intermediaries and borrowers, while 
providing transparency to the borrower does not change the distribution of payoffs. 
We introduce and test the ability of a one-shot game to measure the trust characteristics of 
subjects and to predict trusting behavior in a subsequent repeated version of the same stage 
game. This procedure may have value in other applications not yet explored.    
Overall, our findings indicate that in the multi-level trust game transparency can matter, 
improving outcomes in financial markets and economic welfare. On the other hand, only one 
side of transparency matters.  For financial markets this implies that not all forms of transparency 
are equal in their ability to improve market outcomes.  In the analog pass through securities 
market (the collateralized, home mortgage debt obligation market we discussed in the 
introduction), the ability to verify the credit worthiness of borrowers would seem to be the most  
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important aspect of transparency.  In addition, transparency affects welfare asymmetrically. 
When transparency matters, it is borrowers and intermediaries benefit more than investors in 
relative terms.  If the policy goal of the government is to make home ownership (and borrowing 
in general) more accessible, then investor transparency (allowing investors to see the transactions 
between intermediaries and the ultimate borrowers) can facilitate this while shifting economic 
welfare toward the ultimate borrowers.  
There are several obvious extensions to our research.  First, trust relationship may involve 
even higher orders and our game would be easy to generalize to three or more levels.  Second, 
trust may be circular instead of linear as we have in our game.  It would be simple to design a 
game where either the borrower gave back money both to the investor and intermediary or, 
alternatively to the investor with the investor paying the intermediary (Sheremeta and Zhang, 
2010).  Finally, calls for reform often include reporting standards and oversight bodies.  One 
could easily add a monitoring agent to replace direct transparency in our setup up.  One could 
also report prior aggregate outcomes (as in the original Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995, 
paper) or current aggregate information.  Of course, all may interact with transparency and help 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table I:  Summary of Treatments 
Treatment 
Players Observing  
Additional Information 
Transparency About  
Transactions of:  
Number  
of Subjects 
No-T None  None  48 
Borrower-T  Borrower  Investor and Intermediary  48 
Investor-T  Investor  Intermediary and Borrower  48 
Full-T  Investor and Borrower All  Players  48 
 
 












P-Value (3 d.o.f.) 



























































































































































Standard deviations are in parentheses 






Table III:  Regressions on Efficiency and Payoffs in One-Shot Games 
 
Variables  Efficiency Payoff  Investor Payoff  Intermediary Payoff  Borrower 
























Observations 64  64  64  64 
R-squared 0.041  0.023  0.004  0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 





Regressions on Payoffs to: 
(3) 
Regression on Share of Payoffs to: 
Investor Intermediary  Borrower  Investor Intermediary  Borrower 
























































Observations  640  640 640 640  640 640  640 
R-squared  0.017  0.017 0.015 0.017  0.060 0.032  0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




Table V:  Regression of Amounts Sent and Returned in  
Repeated-Setting using History Variables (Periods 3-11) 
 
 Regression  Number 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variable S1  S2  R3  R2 
Inverse Period  2.574  7.129**  7.295  3.490* 
 (1.630)  (3.236)  (4.668)  (1.969) 
Investor-T 0.928***  -0.207 0.460 0.363 
 (0.323)  (0.493)  (0.699)  (0.298) 
Borrower-T -0.145  -0.108 1.601 0.284 
 (0.245)  (0.493)  (1.186)  (0.294) 
Itype  0.124** 0.112*** 0.075** 0.083*** 
 (0.060)  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Current period’s observable choices 
S1   1.419***  0.826*** 
   (0.082)    (0.061) 
S2     1.331***  -0.327*** 
     (0.053)  (0.036) 
R3       0.451*** 
       (0.018) 
S1Vis     -0.019   
     (0.192)   
Prior period’s observable choices 
LagS1 0.354***  -0.310**    -0.431*** 
 (0.052)  (0.122)    (0.074) 
LagS2   -0.174**  -0.289***  0.181*** 
   (0.069)  (0.082)  (0.042) 
LagR3   0.456***  0.393***  -0.272*** 
   (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.030) 
LagR2 0.160***  -0.147**    0.589*** 
 (0.023)  (0.073)    (0.044) 
LagS1Vis    -0.284   
     (0.213)   
LagS2Vis -0.025      
 (0.041)       
LagR3Vis 0.004       
 (0.024)       
LagR2Vis     0.107   
     (0.090)   
Constant 0.748  -2.529***  -4.054***  -1.362*** 
 (0.560)  (0.945)  (1.096)  (0.485) 
Observations 576  576  576  576 
R-squared 0.483  0.750  0.859  0.884 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 



















INSTRUCTIONS (Example of the No-Transparency Treatment) 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The currency used in the experiment is experimental dollars, 
and they will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _2_ experimental dollars to _1_ dollar. At 
the end of experiment your earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very 
important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come 
to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be 
paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. 
 
The 24 participants in today’s experiment will be randomly assigned into 8 three-player groups. 
In addition to the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific 
type in the group, designated as Player 1, Player 2, or Player 3. You and the other two 
participants in your group will make choices that will determine your payoffs. The experiment 
consists of four decision stages. 
 
In stage 1, Player 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Player 2. The 
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Finally, at the end of the Stage 4 the total earnings are reported to each person. Please record the 




The computer will assign you and two other participants to a three-player group, consisting of 
Player 1, Player 2, and Player 3. In stage 1, Player 1 receives $10 and then decides how many 
dollars to send to Player 2. The amount sent by Player 1 is multiplied by 3. In stage 2, Player 2 
decides how many dollars to send to Player 3. The amount sent by Player 2 is multiplied by 3. In 
stage 3, Player 3 decides how many dollars to send back to Player 2. Finally, in stage 4, Player 2 
decides how many dollars to send back to Player 1. 
 
After making the first decision, Player 1 will only learn the decision made Player 2 in stage 4. 
However, Player 1 will not learn the decisions made by Player 2 in stage 2 and Player 3 in stage 
3. Player 2 will learn all the decisions made by all players in all stages. Before making a 
decision, Player 3 will only learn the decision made by Player 2 in stage 2. However, Player 3 
will not learn the decisions made by Player 1 in stage 1 and Player 2 in stage 4. 
 
At the end of Stage 4 the total earnings are reported to each person.  This experiment is now over 





Consider a hypothetical example: 
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $7 to Player 2 
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $12 to Player 3 
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $19 to Player 2 
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $16 to Player 1 
  
In stage 1, Player 1 sends $7 to Player 2 and keeps $3 ($10-$7=$3). The amount received by 
Player 2 is $21 ($7×3=$21). At the end of stage 1, Player 2 learns the decision made by Player 1. 
 
In stage 2, Player 2 sends $12 to Player 3 and keeps $9 ($21-$12=$9). The amount received by 
Player 3 is $36 ($12×3=$36). At the end of stage 2, Player 3 learns the decision made by Player 
2. 
 
In stage 3, Player 3 sends back $19 to Player 2 and keeps $17 ($36-$19=$17). The amount 
received by Player 2 is $19. However, Player 2 also has an additional $9 which was kept in stage 





In stage 4, Player 2 sends back $16 to Player 1 and keeps $12 ($28-$16=$12). However, Player 1 
also has an additional $3 which was kept in stage 1, for a total of $19 ($16+$3=$19). At the end 
of stage 4, Player 1 learns the decision made by Player 2. 
  
As the result, the total earnings for each player are: 
Player 1 earns $19 
Player 2 earns $12 
Player 3 earns $17 
  
QUIZ #1 
A hypothetical example: 
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $2 to Player 2 
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $0 to Player 3 
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $0 to Player 2 
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $0 to Player 1 
  
What are the total earnings for each player? 
Player 1 earns ____? 
Player 2 earns ____? 
Player 3 earns ____? 




A hypothetical example: 
Stage 1: Player 1 sends $9 to Player 2 
Stage 2: Player 2 sends $25 to Player 3 
Stage 3: Player 3 sends back $50 to Player 2 
Stage 4: Player 2 sends back $15 to Player 1 
  
What are the total earnings for each player? 
Player 1 earns ____? 
Player 2 earns ____? 
Player 3 earns ____? 
  
(The following distributed after subjects played the one-shot game) 
 INSTRUCTIONS - 10 MORE REPLICATIONS 
This experiment consists of 10 decision-making periods. The rules for each period are exactly 
the same as the rules for the previous experiment. In all 10 periods of the experiment you will 
remain the same type of player as in the previous experiment. However, at the beginning of the 
first period, you will be randomly rematched with two other players of the other types to form a 
new three-player group. You will remain with this new three-player group for all 10 periods of 
the experiment.  
33 
 
During each period, you and the other two participants in your group will make choices as in the 
previous experiment that will determine your payoffs. Please record the decisions and your 
earnings in each period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading. 
We will randomly choose 1 of the 10 periods for actual payment using a die roll using a ten-
sided die with numbers from 1 to 10. Your final earnings for these experiments consist of: (1) 
your show up fee, (2) earnings from the first experiment and (3) you earnings from the randomly 
selected period in the second experiment. Note that after this 10-period experiment there will be 
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